And yet there were dozens of other
points where an attack in force was possible. Each must be covered
with a force at least strong enough to hold the enemy back long
enough to enable the forces stationed at the other points to come
up to support. Here was the great advantage that the Austrians
had to begin with; an advantage which the attacking army always
enjoys. The attacking general alone knows where the first battle
shall be fought.
The Serbians, therefore, could not count on meeting the Austrians in
full force before they could enter Serbian territory. They realized
that they must give way at the first contact; that the Austrians would
undoubtedly advance quite some distance within Serbian territory
before enough Serbian forces could be brought up against them to
make the opposition effective.
Realizing this, it was decided to place fairly strong advance guards
at all probable points of invasion with orders to resist as long
as possible; until, in fact, defensive tactics could be adapted
to the situation and the main Serbian army could be brought up
to offer battle.
However, two points stood out as the most probable. These were the two
already mentioned; the north, along the line from Obrenovatz to Belgrade
and to Semendria; or, the front Obrenovatz-Ratza-Losnitza-Liubovia.
The first possibility had the advantage to the Austrians of offering
the shortest route to the center of the country--the Morava Valley,
their natural objective.
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