Two days
later an army corps would have been needed for the enterprise, for
by this time the Serbian army had begun concentrating considerable
numbers within striking distance of the capital. Thus the first
opportunity was lost by the tardiness of the Austrians to act.
It is presumed that the reader has already studied the description
of this theatre of the war presented elsewhere in this work. Aside
from that, the movements that follow should only be traced with
the aid of a map. Written words are inadequate to give a concrete
picture of the field of operations.
The Austrian General Staff realized the difficulties of crossing
the Danube. Its general plan, probably prepared long before,
contemplated a main attack that should begin from another quarter.
The Austro-Serbian frontier, almost 340 miles in extent, is formed
on the north by the Save as well as by the Danube, and on the east
and southeast by the Drina River. These two smaller streams abound
in convenient fords, especially in summer. To many of these points on
the northeastern frontier Austria had already constructed strategic
railways. Moreover, the Austrian territory throughout this section is
so mountainous and well timbered that large forces of troops could
be well screened from observation, whereas the country opposite
Belgrade is fiat and bane.
It was from this direction that the Serbian General Staff expected
the first advance of the enemy.
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