At the head of the Austrian campaigns against Serbia was General
Potiorek, generally described as a textbook strategist. But just
how much his failures were due to his own inefficiency and how
much to the inefficiency of those under him will probably never
be determined; he had in the end to suffer for both.
These were the two great contending forces that were set in motion
by the departure of Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister,
from Belgrade, on July 25, 1914. On the same day the Prince Regent
Alexander signed a decree ordering the general mobilization of the
Serbian army. Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria declared
war. By that time Serbia was in the midst of her mobilization.
That the Austrians, who had the advantage of having taken the
initiative, and who had presumably chosen their own time for the
opening of hostilities, did not immediately take full advantage of
their favorable situation has caused much surprise among impartial
military critics. On the same day that they declared war they had
the opportunity to hurl their troops across the Danube and take
Belgrade with practically no opposition. Apparently they were not
ready; from that moment the difficulties that would have attended
such a movement increased hourly.
A force of 20,000 men was raised almost immediately for the defense
of Belgrade. To meet this opposition the Austrians had, on the
evening of the day war was declared, July 18, 1914, only one division
concentrated between Semlin and Pancsova, opposite Belgrade--a force
that was hardly sufficient to take the Serbian capital.
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