It was
vain, therefore, at the present time, to hope that the establishment
of the direct communication between Metz and Verdun might pass
into the hands of the invaders.
On the other hand, there was a direct line of railway running through
Rheims, Rethel, Mezieres to the great war depot, Coblenz on the
Rhine. A branch line from Metz, through Luxemburg, thus gave
communication to the eastern wing. All the links of this were in
German hands, except Rheims, and if that railroad center could be
secured, the importance to the German advance would be enormous.
Under such circumstances, it can scarcely be held that Rheims was
not necessarily a point, the attack of which was due to military
necessity.
The formation for this began on September 17, 1914. Crossing the
Aisne by the old ford of Berry-au-Bac, a powerful army under the
direct leadership of Field Marshal von Heeringen debouched upon
the open country between Berry-au-Bac and Suippes, east of Rheims.
It was at this point that the German commander in chief of this
section of the battle line intended to deliver a crushing blow
by which might be regained the prestige secured at Charleroi and
lost again at the Marne.
Surprise may be felt that so important a railway center as Rheims
should not have been a strongly fortified place. It had been so
once, though the fortifications were old-fashioned. But, instead of
bringing these points of natural defense up to the highest degree
of modern efficiency, the French had dismantled them entirely,
so as to make Rheims with its glorious cathedral an open town,
safe from bombardment.
Pages:
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211