General Foch's daring, the success of the maneuver,
and the fact that the conduct of all the French armies on that
day and the day following seems to be with the full cognizance of
this venture, led inevitably to the conclusion that those brilliant
feats, conceived by General Foch, had been communicated to General
Joffre in time for the French General Staff to direct the French
armies to the right and left of General Foch to cooperate with
his action. Had General Foch been less ably supported, his wedge
might have proved a weak salient open to attack on both sides.
But General Foch's main army to the west kept General von Buelow
busy, and General Langle's army to the east fought too stubbornly
for the Duke of Wuerttemberg to dare detach any forces for the relief
of General von Buelow. General von Hausen's Saxon Army was weak,
at best.
What were the forces that operated to make this particular point
so weak are not generally known. As, however, the divisions from
Alsace were much in evidence three or four days later, it is more
than probable that these divisions were intended for service at this
point, and also to reenforce General von Kluck's army, but that,
by the quick offensive assumed by General Joffre on the Ourcq, and,
owing to the roundabout nature of the German means of communication,
these expected reenforcements had not arrived. The German official
dispatches point out that General von Buelow's retreat was necessitated
by the retreat of General von Kluck.
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