The results
were withering, and General von Buelow did not attempt it a second
time. There seems reason to believe that General von Buelow had
counted upon acting as a reserve force to General von Kluck during
the latter's advance, and that, consequently, he did not think it
prudent to risk heavy loss of life until he knew the situation to
westward of him. There was some sharp "bomb" work at Fere Champenoise
on September 8, and then came the night of the 8th.
It will be remembered that at the close of the battle of Montmirail
on the evening of September 8, 1914, the western flank of Von Buelow's
army had been exposed by the advance of General d'Esperey and the
retreat of General von Kluck. Information of this reached Foch,
and despite the danger of the maneuver, he thrust out his mobile
left like a great tongue. That night the weather turned stormy,
facilitating this move. At one o'clock in the morning, the statement
has been made, word reached General Foch indirectly that air patrols
had observed a gap in the alignment of the German armies between
General von Buelow's left and General von Hausen's right.
During the darkness and the rain, therefore, General Foch had worked
two complete surprises on General von Buelow. He had enveloped the
German commander's right flank, and was safely ensconced there
with General d'Esperey's army behind him, since the latter had
by now advanced to Montmirail.
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