It is to be remembered that this actual
fighting army of more than a million men depended for food and for
ammunition supplies upon the routes from Belgium and Luxemburg by
way of Mezieres and Montmedy, and the circuitous line to Brussels
via St. Quentin. Had Maubeuge fallen a little earlier the situation
of the Central Powers would have been less difficult, and both
commissariat and ammunition problems would have been easier of
solution. But Maubeuge held out until September 7, 1914, and by
that time the prime results of the battles of the Marne had been
achieved. To this problem Verdun was the key, for from Metz through
Verdun ran the main line, less than one-half the length of line
to the Belgian bases of supplies, and, owing to the nature of the
country, a line that could be held with a quarter the number of
men. But Verdun stood, and General Joffre held the two armies back
to back, converging on the point at Verdun.
Such was the country over which the battles of the Marne were fought,
such were the numbers and dispositions of the several armies on
each side, and such, as far as can be judged, were the plans and
counterplans of the strategic leaders in the great conflict.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XIV
FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE
The first movement in this concerted plan was taken by the German
extreme right. This was the closing in of General von Kluck's army in
a southeasterly direction.
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