The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of
four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne.
The Second Army (General von Buelow), with three active army corps
and two reserve corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The
Third German Army (General van Hausen), with two active army corps
and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne and reached Chateau
Porcin-Attigny.
Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German
Armies, making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps,
and numerous Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French
troops (Fourth and Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the
others from Verdun to the Vosges. Such was the situation.
It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army,
commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Esperey, would have
found itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of
the British and French forces operating on its left, if the French
had accepted the challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander
in chief resolutely chose the alternative that obviated such a
risk, that is, he decided on a postponement of the offensive and
the continuation of the retreat.
Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of
the retreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-Francois, and the region north of Bar-le-Due.
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