But this movement could not be accomplished in a few
hours. It required, even with all the perfection of organization
shown by the French railways during this war, a certain number of
days. As long as this operation from the right to the left had
not been accomplished, as long as the left wing of the French army
and even the center remained without the reenforcement of elements
taken from the right, it would have been extremely imprudent, not
to say rash, for the French high command to attempt a decisive
battle. If General Joffre had risked a battle immediately he would
have been playing the game without all his trumps in hand and would
have been in danger of a defeat, and even of a decided disaster,
from which it might have been impossible to recover.
The second alternative consisted in drawing back and in profiting
from a retreat by putting everything in shipshape order to bring
about a new grouping of forces. They would allow the Germans to
advance, and when the occasion showed itself favorable the French
armies, along with the British army, would take the offensive and
wage a decisive battle.
It was to this second decision that General Joffre came. As soon as
on August 25, 1914, he had made up his mind as to what the French
retreat was going to lead he gave orders for a new marshaling of
forces and for preparations with a view to the offensive.
General Joffre has made no objection to the publication of his
orders in detail from that date, August 25, 1914, down to the Battle
of the Marne.
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