In that situation, with a river on each of his flanks, which
united about five miles below the city, and your army above him, you
could have intercepted his reinforcements and supplies, cut off all
his communication with the country, and, if necessary, have despatched
assistance to open a passage for General Burgoyne. This scheme was too
visible to succeed: for had General Washington suffered you to command
the open country above him, I think it a very reasonable conjecture
that the conquest of Burgoyne would not have taken place, because
you could, in that case, have relieved him. It was therefore
necessary, while that important victory was in suspense, to trepan you
into a situation in which you could only be on the defensive,
without the power of affording him assistance. The manoeuvre had its
effect, and Burgoyne was conquered.
There has been something unmilitary and passive in you from the time
of your passing the Schuylkill and getting possession of Philadelphia,
to the close of the campaign. You mistook a trap for a conquest, the
probability of which had been made known to Europe, and the edge of
your triumph taken off by our own information long before.
Having got you into this situation, a scheme for a general attack
upon you at Germantown was carried into execution on the 4th of
October, and though the success was not equal to the excellence of the
plan, yet the attempting it proved the genius of America to be on
the rise, and her power approaching to superiority.
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