"[35]
An inspection of the Constitution will show that the right of
property in a slave is not "_distinctly_ and _expressly_ affirmed"
in it. Bear in mind, the Judges do not pledge their judicial opinion
that such right is _impliedly_ affirmed in the Constitution; but
they pledge their veracity that it is "_distinctly_ and _expressly_"
affirmed there--"distinctly," that is, not mingled with anything
else--"expressly," that is, in words meaning just that, without the
aid of any inference, and susceptible of no other meaning.
If they had only pledged their judicial opinion that such right is
affirmed in the instrument by implication, it would be open to
others to show that neither the word "slave" nor "slavery" is to be
found in the Constitution, nor the word "property" even, in any
connection with language alluding to the things slave, or slavery,
and that wherever in that instrument the slave is alluded to, he is
called a "person";--and wherever his master's legal right in
relation to him is alluded to, it is spoken of as "service or labor
which may be due,"--as a debt payable in service or labor.[36] Also,
it would be open to show, by contemporaneous history, that this mode
of alluding to slaves and slavery, instead of speaking of them, was
employed on purpose to exclude from the Constitution the idea that
there could be property in man.
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