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Shon Harris, Allen Harper, Chris Eagle, and Jonathan Ness

"Gray Hat Hacking, Second Edition"

Weak DACLs enable many
different possibilities. AccessChk is your tool to enumerate process DACLs.
C:\tools>accesschk.exe -pq *
[4] System
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
[856] smss.exe
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
[904] csrss.exe
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
[936] winlogon.exe
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
[980] services.exe
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
[992] lsass.exe
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
[1188] svchost.exe
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
Cesar Cerrudo, an Argentinean pen-tester who focuses on Windows Access Control,
recently released a ???Practical 10 minutes security audit??? guide with one of the examples
being a NULLDACL on an Oracle process allowing code injection. You can find a link to
it in the ???Reference??? section.
Reference
Practical 10 minutes security audit Oracle case www.argeniss.com/research/
10MinSecAudit.zip
Enumerating Other Named Kernel Objects
(Semaphores, Mutexes, Events, Devices)
While there might not be an elevation of privilege opportunity in tampering with other
kernel objects, an attacker could very likely induce a denial-of-service condition if
Gray Hat Hacking: The Ethical Hacker??™s Handbook
440
allowed access to other named kernel objects.


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